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3Simultaneous encryption and integrity
? Both confidentiality and integrity are often required.
? Indeed, encrypting without integrity protection is now 
known to be dangerous (variety of attacks).
? One simple way to provide both services is the encrypt-
then-MAC model where we encrypt the message and 
then compute a MAC, using two distinct keys.
? This is very effective (if used with care), but each block 
of data is processed twice.
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Add-redundancy-and-encrypt model
? To avoid the extra work of double processing, 
one widely discussed alternative to encrypt-
then-MAC is the add-redundancy-and-encrypt
model.
? Here, predictable redundancy is added to the 
plaintext (e.g. a fixed block at the end) prior to 
encryption, and the receiver checks for the 
presence of the redundancy after decryption.
5Shortcomings of model
? The encryption method needs to be chosen 
carefully (e.g., a stream cipher is bad news)!
? So does the method of adding redundancy.
– Suppose the ‘fixed block at the end’ method is used.
– Obvious dangers arise if the fixed block arises by 
chance in the middle of the plaintext!
? Despite these dangers, the technique has often 
been advocated.
6
EPBC mode
? One major problem with the add-redundancy-then-
encrypt approach is that commonly used encryption 
modes are not appropriate.
? That is, if a mode like CBC is used, then relatively 
simple forgery attacks are possible (as we show).
? We consider a mode specially designed for use with 
add-redundancy-then-encrypt, namely EPBC, and 
show that this mode too is subject to forgery attacks.
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8
CBC mode = no good!
? Having decided to use add-redundancy-and-
encrypt, the encryption method needs to be 
chosen.
? It is not hard to see that CBC mode is 
completely inappropriate.
? This is because ciphertext errors only 
propagate in a very limited way.
? That is, changing ciphertext block Ci only 
affects Pi and Pi+1.
9CBC decryption – error propagation
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EPBC mode
? EPBC (Efficient error-Propagating Block 
Chaining) was proposed by Zúquete and 
Guedes in 1997.
? It is a mode of operation in which ciphertext 
errors propagate in an unlimited way.
? Designed as an improvement of a mode called 
IOBC (Recacha, 1996).
? Uses an n-bit block cipher where n is even 
(assume n=2m).
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EPBC mode operation
? Uses two n-bit secret IVs:  F0, G0.
? To encrypt plaintext P1, P2, …, Pt:
– perform the following for i = 1, 2, ..., t:
? Gi = Pi ⊕ Fi-1
? Fi = eK(Gi)
? Ci = Fi ⊕ g(Gi-1)      [except for i=1:  C1 = F1 ⊕ G0]
where ⊕ denotes bit-wise exclusive or, and g is a 
function mapping an n-bit block to an n-bit block.
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The function g
? Suppose X is an n-bit block, where X = L||R, and L and 
R are m-bit blocks.
? Then:
g(X) = (L ∨ ~R) || (L ∧ ~R)
where ∨ denotes bit-wise inclusive or, ∧ denotes bit-wise logical 
and, and ~ denotes logical negation (changing every zero to 
one and vice versa).
? Note that g is not one-to-one.  [This is the only change 
between OPBC to EPBC:  IOBC uses a one-to-one 
function g].
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EPBC encryption (also IOBC)
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An observation
? To launch a forgery attack, it would appear to be 
necessary to have knowledge of the ‘internal’ values of 
Fi and Gi.
? However, since these values are never transmitted 
(and F0 and G0 are assumed to be secret), attacking 
this mode would appear to be difficult.
? Moreover, g is deliberately chosen to be not one-to-
one to thwart known-plaintext based forgery attacks 
which apply to long messages encrypted using IOBC.
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Objective of attack
? We assume that the add-redundancy-and-
encrypt model is being used with EPBC.
? We also assume that the method of adding 
redundancy is to add a fixed block to the end of 
the message.
? The objective is to take a valid ciphertext and 
use this to construct another ‘forged’ ciphertext 
which will have the correct redundancy when 
decrypted.
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Observation regarding g
? Suppose g(X) = L′||R′, where L′ = (λ′1,λ′2,..,λ′m) 
and R′ = (r′1,r′2,..,r′m).
? Then, for every i, if λ′i = 0, then r′i = 0.
? To see this, suppose X = L||R, where L = 
(λ1,λ2,..,λm) and R′ = (r1,r2,..,rm).
? If λ′i = 0 for some i, then, since λ′i = λi ∨ ~ri, we 
know immediately that λi = 0 and ri = 1.  Hence 
r′i = λi ∧ ~ri = 0.
? That is, pairs (λ′i, r′i) can never equal (0, 1).
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A more general observation
? Using the same notation, if (λi, ri) is in the set 
A, then (λ′i, r′i) must be a member of the set B, 
where the possibilities for the sets A and B are 
now given.
? Unless |A| = 1, given a random set A of a 
certain size, the expected size of B is always 
smaller than |A|.
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The sets A and B
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Using the observation  I
? Our objective is to use knowledge of known 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs (Pi, Ci) to learn pairs 
(Fi, Gi).
? Suppose we know s consecutive pairs, i.e. we 
know:
(Pj, Cj), (Pj+1, Cj+1), …, (Pj+s-1, Cj+s-1).
where we suppose j > 1.
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Using the observation  II
? We know:
Cj = Fj ⊕ g(Gj-1)
? We also know that if g(Gj-1) = L′||R′, where L′ = 
(λ′1,λ′2,..,λ′m) and R′ = (r′1,r′2,..,r′m), then (λ′i, r′i) can never 
equal (0, 1) for any i.
? Hence, knowledge of Cj gives some knowledge about Fj.
? Specifically we know that certain bit pairs cannot occur in 
Fj, where each bit pair contains a bit from the left half and 
the corresponding bit from the right half.
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Using the observation  III
? We also know:
Gj+1 = Pj+1 ⊕ Fj
? Hence knowledge of forbidden bit pairs in Fj, 
combined with knowledge of Pj+1, gives us 
knowledge of forbidden bit pairs in Gj+1.
? This means we know of even more (potentially) 
forbidden bit pairs in g(Gj+1).
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Using the observation  IV
? Since we know:
Cj+2 = Fj+2 ⊕ g(Gj+1)
and we know Cj+2, this gives us even more forbidden 
bit pairs in Fj+2, and so on.
? For sufficiently large w, we hope that we know Fj+2w for 
certain.
? This immediately gives complete knowledge of Gj+2w+1, 
using knowledge of Pj+2w+1.
? I.e. we have complete knowledge of all Fj+2w and 
Gj+2w+1 for all sufficiently large w.
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A side remark
? In our discussion we have not used all the 
available knowledge.
? In fact we only use knowledge of Cj, Cj+2, Cj+4, 
… and Pj+1, Pj+3, Pj+5, …
? We also only learn information about Fj, Fj+2, 
Fj+4, … and Gj+1, Gj+3, Gj+5, …
? However, we now repeat the process starting 
with Fj+1, using all the rest of the information we 
have.
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How big is sufficiently large?
? Consider any pair of bit positions: (i, i+m).
? Returning to our previous argument, we know 
that g(Gj-1) cannot have (0, 1) in these two bit 
positions.
? Hence, we know that the pair of bit positions in 
Fj = Cj ⊕ g(Gj-1) can only take three of the 
possible four values.
? Precisely which three possibilities will depend 
on Cj, which should look random.
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How big  II?
? Hence we know that the two bit positions in Gj+1 can 
only take three of the possible four values.
? The possibilities for the two bit positions in g(Gj+1) will 
depend on which three pairs are possible (using our 
table for the sets A and B).
? That is, there is a 50% chance that we will know that 
the two bit positions in g(Gj+1) have only two possible 
values, and a 50% chance that there are 3 possible 
values.
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How big  III?
? Using standard 
probabilistic arguments 
for stochastic processes, 
the probability that there 
will only be a single 
possibility for the bit pair 
after v iterations of the 
above process is equal 
to the top right entry in 
the vth power of the 
following 4 by 4 matrix:
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
1000
6/16/500
02/12/10
0010
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How big  IV?
? For v = 10, this is 0.710.
? For v = 20, this is 0.953.
? That is, after 20 iterations, i.e., if we know 40 
consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we will know for 
certain around 95% of the bit pairs.
? I.e., if m=64, we will know for certain around 120 of the 
128 bits.
? There will only be a small number of possibilities for 
the other bit pairs.
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What else needs to be done?
? Once we know some values of Fi and Gi, we need to 
use these values to construct a forgery.
? This is straightforward, as we now show.
? We suppose that the added redundancy prior to 
encryption is a fixed n-bit block, i.e. the final n-bit block 
of a plaintext message is equal to a fixed block, V.
? The presence (or absence) of this block is used by a 
decrypter to check that a message is valid (or not). 
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Resources for attack
? We suppose that an attacker has the first s blocks of an 
encrypted message C1, C2, …, Cs, for which he/she 
knows the internal value Gs.
? We suppose the attacker also knows the final two blocks 
(C′u-1, C′u) of an encrypted message for which the 
attacker knows the internal value G′u-2.  [NB: if P′u is the 
final plaintext block of this message, then P′u = V.] 
? We suppose these two part ciphertexts have been 
encrypted using the same key K.  [These two part
ciphertexts could be the first s blocks and the final 2 
blocks of a longer encrypted message].
32
A forged message
? We now define a ‘forged’ ciphertext message:
C*1, C*2, …, C*s+2
? where
C*i = Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ s);
C*s+1 = C′u-1 ⊕ g(G′u-2) ⊕ g(Gs);
C*s+2 = C′u.
? When this forged message is decrypted, the 
final block will be P′u = V.
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Encrypt-then-MAC model
? There seem to be too many problems with the 
add-redundancy-and-encrypt model to be able 
to recommend it.
? Encrypt-then-MAC seems much safer, and is 
provably secure.
? However even this approach needs to be 
implemented with care; in particular, a 
decrypter must not attempt to decrypt a 
message if the MAC check fails.
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Combined encryption/integrity modes
? There are alternatives to encrypt-then-MAC.
? Of particular interest is the Offset CodeBook (OCB) 
mode, due to Rogaway, Bellare, Black and Krovetz 
(2001), and a revised OCB v2.0 more recently released.
? These block-cipher-based modes only require each 
plaintext block to be processed once, and have a 
complexity-theoretic ‘proof of security’ (based on the 
assumption that the block cipher is a pseudo-random 
permutation family).
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Standards
? OCB v2.0, together with other carefully 
specified ways of combining encryption and 
MACing, are in the process of being 
standardised.
? One such standard will be ISO/IEC 19772 
(currently at Committee Draft stage).
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Further reading
? The attack described in this talk is given in:
– C. J. Mitchell, Cryptanalysis of the EPBC authenticated 
encryption mode.  [Copies available from the author].
? For more information on cryptography standards 
(including MACs, modes, etc.) see:
– A. Dent and C. Mitchell, User’s guide to cryptography and 
standards.  Artech House, 2005.
? The standard reference for much of crypto (even 
though it is now 10 years old) remains:
– A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone, Handbook of 
Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997.
